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Physical security 
models, philosophies, and context 
Karen A. Forcht 
S. E. Krnck 
James Madison University 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents physical security of a computer facility within the context of a corpo­
rate environment. The context is established from several different perspectives. It first presents 
physical security philosophies and illustrates the philosophies via the Onion and Garlic Mod­
els. It defines a process for identifying and describing transition strategies between security 
levels. Once the models are defined, a Macro View of physical security is presented. This view 
discusses physical security goals and critical factors such as budget, monitoring and redun­
dancy. With this context established, the Micro View is presented. Its focus is on information 
technology (IT) facilities that protect centralized or clustered IT resources. A variety of envi­
ronmental threats, threat agents, and precautions are identified. Questions to help assess the 
security of off-site storage of backup media are provided. Procedures for establishing the tran­
sition strategy to the IT facility, authentication, access control logs, suggestions for handling 
emergency conditions, and other considerations are enumerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early days of computing, computers — and the information they processed — were 
protected in the most fundamental way; they were locked up, with entry limited to a few autho­
rized operators, administrators and programmers. Today, computers are cheaper, smaller, por­
table, and more accessible to almost eyeryone. With computers on eyery desk, connected yia 
networks to other local and remote systems, it has become less and less feasible to protect infor­
mation with the old types of physical security deyices. As a consequence, other types of security 
haye become more important. But despite adyanc(;s in computer security and communications 
security, physical security remains a crucial component of an organization's total security plan. 
Physical security must protect the system from a myriad of threats on a daily basis. As Tom 
Wadlow indicates (200, p. 101), some of the troublesome day-to-day incidents in a computer 
facility include: 
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• Employees tampering with equipment 
• Improper access to backup tapes and archives 
• Accidental disconnection of production equipment 
• Power circuit overload from unplanned equipment addition 
• Power failure 
• Water damage 
• Theft 
To effectively deal with these issues and more, the physical security goal must support the 
system security posture. "The goal is to create layers of protection that can support the security 
policy and provide reasonable protection against threats that are of the greatest concern" (Wadlow, 
2000, p. 103). In some ways, physical security is the easiest and most rewarding type of security. 
It is tangible, very visible and reassuring. With that said, it is important to note that it is also very 
easy to go overboard with physical security and worry about unrealistic issues. Designers of 
physical security solutions must be aware of this tendency and try to ensure that there is balance 
between what is to be protected and the methods that are taken to protect it. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY PHILOSOPHY 
The general philosophy of physical security is usually a mix between restrictive and per­
missive philosophies. Within a security layer, people are governed by a more or less permissive 
model. Once people are allowed into that area, they can go anywhere they would like within it. In 
contrast, movement between layers is a more restrictive model. No one can cross between layers 
except in an explicitly authorized manner. In designing the physical security framework for a 
facility, one must design the facility in such a way that it is extremely difficult to move between 
layers in any way other than the ways that are explicitly permitted (Wadlow, 2000, p. 109). 
The Onion Model 
One of the most basic physical security models is the onion model, or the layered approach 
(Wadlow, 2000, p. 103). Figure 1 illustrates this model. 
In this model, a security process is defined that covers everything from the outside world to 
the innermost security vault. The transitions (A, B, C, D) are defined by the protocol or proce­
dures for moving from one level to another (Wadlow, 2000, p. 103). The rule is to describe the 
various places where physical security is to be applied and then to describe the transition between 
the places. The transitions are defined as conditions and paths that allow/prevent traffic between 
the layers and how the transition is authorized. 
To simplify the illustration, transitions shown in Figure 1 as A, B, C, and D are shown as 
one way. In reality, however, transitions are actually defined for moving in both directions. As 
mentioned above, movement becomes more restrictive as people transition from the outside to the 
innermost secure areas and it should be extremely difficult to move between layers in unautho­
rized ways. This is especially important in protecting the network management center and other 
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technology clusters of an organization It is very useful to diagram how the transitions are to work 
and what the "preferred paths" are between layers. Methods for securing alternate paths must be 
identified and addressed. Transitions that occur during an emergency must also be identified-if 
security is to be bypassed, procedures must be specified. Another way to define the transitions is 
to develop a transition matrix. Figure 2 is a sample transition matrix that shows the parameters 
involved in defining transitions between layers. It illustrates two layers-the outside world and the 
casual visitors. 
Figure 1. Onion Model for Physical Security 
Onion Model for Physical Security 
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Figure 2. Sample Transition Matrix 
Layer Description 
Personnel 
allowed Transition Condition Approved by 
Outside 
World 
Uncontrolied 
area surround­
ing the facility 
Anybody To Casual 
Visitor 
0800 to 1800 
General business 
visitors only 
Receptionist 
0800 to 1800 
Badged employees 
Receptionist 
1800 to 0800 
Prescheduled 
appointments only 
Security guard 
1800 to 0800 
Badged employees 
Security Guard 
Casual 
Visitors 
Waiting area 
in lobby for 
visitors 
Those 
approved by 
transition from 
outside world 
and from 
employees 
To Outside 
Worid 
None required 
To Employee 0800 to 1800 
Badged employees 
Badged contractors 
Badge reader 
1800 to 0800 
Badged employees 
Badge readers 
security guard & log 
entry 
1800 to 0800 
Badged contractor 
Badge readers 
security goard S log 
entry. Letter on file from 
Contract manager. 
0800 to 1800 
Visitors 
Receptionist and log 
entry. Badged 
employee/contractor 
must escort and sign 
for visitor. 
1800 to 0800 
Visitors 
Security guard and log 
entry. Badged 
employee/contractor 
must escort and sign 
for visitor. 
Emergency 
condition 24-hours 
a day 
Receptionist or security 
guard - escorts 
optional 
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A matrix of this nature may be used to ensure all variables are addressed and helps provide 
an element of consistency and continuity within the process. 
The Garlic Model 
The Garlic Clove model (Wadlow, 2000, p. 110) of physical security is a natural extension 
of the onion model. It is more sophisticated, more re alistic, and also more complicated. Once a 
framework is defined that identifies the layers and pockets within the layers, the physical security 
design should be developed to match the framework and support the security policy that is to be 
implemented. 
Figure 3. Garlic Clove Model for Physical Security 
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FINAL PHILOSOPHICAL NOTE 
When most people think of physical security, they think of cameras, badge readers, door 
sensors, etc. Although these are important elements of physical security, and we will present a 
number of technology solutions that could be used to provide security for a computer facility. 
procedures play a crucial role and should not be overlooked or forgotten. When you design and 
develop a physical security plan, remember to think pathologically and try to identify all the ways 
that employees can defeat the system. For example, having a badge reader at an entrance to 
identify and authenticate employees is a good solution, but allowing a person to "tailgate" through 
the entrance without providing identification or authorization information defeats the entire sys­
tem. Having a door sensor that detects a door being opened is another viable ingredient to a 
security solution, but if a person can lift a ceiling tile and crawl over the wall and not open the 
door to enter the secured area, all could be lost. It is these types of unauthorized transitions that 
are usually best addressed through good security system design and security procedures, and we 
would be remiss in our discussion if we did not draw attention to the need for user-friendly 
procedures as a vital piece to the physical security puzzle. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY—A MACRO VIEW 
Before we discuss providing security for a computer facility, we must first look at the big 
picture. Securing a corporate computer facility or network management center is a critical ele­
ment of a much larger plan. An understanding of the total solution and security goals is necessary 
to establish a context for the safeguards provided to protect centralized or clustered information 
technology resources. 
Physical Security Goals 
The three primary goals are deterrence, minimize loss, and notification (ADT). Physical 
security can be a deterrent to criminal activity. Cameras are a good example of this. They can be 
either overt or covert. Overt cameras are not hidden and a monitor may be visible to indicate 
"we're taping and watching!" Overt cameras are part of a prevention plan. Covert cameras are 
behind one-way mirrors or similar "screens" to keep them from view. Covert cameras are part of 
a detection plan. In addition to deterring unauthorized events and activities, physical security is 
established to minimize loss in the event of an unauthorized entrance to a restricted area. Provid­
ing additional locks and access controls means that a perpetrator must have more knowledge and 
skill to defeat your defense mechanisms. Finally, notification must occur to enable a quick re­
sponse. The intent is to avoid a confrontation and allow the proper authorities to intercede and 
take appropriate action. 
Critical Factors 
Most security experts concur that budget is at the top of the list of critical factors for 
physical security. In providing a total solution, balance must prevail in terms of what is to be 
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protected and the methods used to protect it. The s:ifeguards that are selected and implemented 
must reduce the risk to an acceptable level based upon realistic threats and the sensitivity and 
criticality of the assets that are to be protected. In many instances, an organization implements 
both area and point coverage to minimize the risks .and optimize its investment. 
Monitoring is another critical element in the physical security solution. Most vendors pro­
vide Central Monitoring Stations that are staffed 24-7-365. This around the clock coverage en­
ables them to respond to a broad range of events in a timely manner. Being able to respond 
quickly is key to this facet of physical security. In fact, many insurance companies offer dis­
counts to policyholders that have independent central monitoring capabilities. By outsourcing 
this function, many corporations reduce their overhead and infrastructure costs while maintain­
ing a high level of support and service. 
In the most critical areas, redundancy must also be provided. By using multiple devices and 
sensors, checks and balances are established within the system. Tracking a sequence of events or 
a "non-sequence" helps identify real incidents from false alarms. For example, having a door 
sensor triggered followed by several motion sensors is a good indication there is an intrusion. 
Having a single motion sensor go off may only indicate there is a spider sitting on the sensor. 
Redundancy is also critical for maintaining operations when there is a major system failure. For 
example, ADT—the largest security company in America—has Redundant Central Monitoring 
Stations so that if a natural disaster occurs at their laome office in Florida, the signals can be re­
routed to another site and service would continue. This clearly illustrates the need for continuous 
protection and the notion that if one system is compromised, security is maintained, as there are 
other systems in place to provide the desired security coverage. 
Procedures are a critical element to a successful physical security program. Procedures 
define roles and responsibilities, what's allowed, and what's not. For example, employees may 
prop open a door for UPS or FedEx delivery. Such action defeats the entire system and must be 
discouraged. Also, having a procedure for emergency response conditions will be necessary 
when security must be bypassed for safety or other critical reasons. If a fire breaks out in a 
storage area, security will be the last thing on people's minds when fire fighters arrive. In addition 
to procedures, security training can provide significant benefits to a corporation. Most security 
threats are related to people. It is common knowledge that employees want to "get the job done" 
and to follow the rules; however, they frequently don't know what the rules are. Any security 
measure that is not understood, that is confusing, or that is viewed to be overly complicated will 
be considered an impediment to productivity and will be circumvented at every opportunity. To 
combat this, each and every employee needs to know why security is important and what he/she 
can and should do to support an organization's security policy. Training can provide the answers 
to many employee questions and create awareness of security policy, practices and procedures. It 
is an important means for alerting employees when there is a change in policy and/or procedures. 
Securing the Perimeter 
Within the United States there are over a million surveillance cameras in place for private 
businesses, federal and state governments, apartment buildings, airports and train stations. 
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garages, retail stores, banks, and restaurants. Most of these systems are used to monitor open 
areas and entrances and they employ video tape recorders to capmre unlawful events and random 
street activity. This can be an important source of evidence for law officials and for prosecuting 
people who engage in unauthorized activities. Cameras are generally mounted at the comers of 
buildings for area coverage and within close proximity to entrances for point coverage. 
Securing External Entrances—Transitioning to Casual Visitor 
There is usually a receptionist and/or security guard in the main lobby or on the floor to 
greet both employees and visitors. All employees and contractors should wear photo ID badges 
for identification purposes. Visitors should sign in upon arrival and when leaving. Visitors should 
be given a visitor's badge when they arrive and it should be collected before they depart the 
premises. Visitors should wear the badge for the duration of the visit and be escorted by employ­
ees to and from meetings. Anyone not wearing a badge should be reported to security for further 
investigation. 
All external entrances should be equipped with a card access system. Authorized employ­
ees and contractors should have access cards to enter the building. Entrances that are restricted 
such as the loading dock area, should limit access. The access cards should allow employees to 
transition from the outside world (refer to Figures 1 and 3) to casual visitor with minimal inter­
vention during normal working hours and before or after normal hours. The access card system 
should log card use of all employees, especially during non-standard hours of operation. 
Securins Internal Entrances—Transitionins to Emvlovee 
The same access cards will allow authorized employees and contractors to transition from 
casual visitor to employee space (refer to Figures 1 & 3). The access card system should enable 
employees to move freely within the employee space. It should log all accesses to include date/ 
time, specific door, employee or card ID. The Security Office will ensure that access cards are 
properly protected and that cards are collected and disabled when employees terminate their 
relationship with the organization. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY—THE MICRO VIEW 
We are not ready to discuss the physical security requirements for centralized or clustered 
information technology resources. We believe that we have sufficiently described the "big pic­
ture" to set the stage and establish a "context" for discussing the safeguards that are needed to 
protect centralized or clustered information technology resources. The effectiveness of the safe­
guards that follow is significantly dependent upon the physical security and transition strategies 
that have been described above. 
92 
8
Journal of International Information Management, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 2, Art. 9
http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/jiim/vol10/iss2/9
Physical Security Joum;il of International Information Management 
Environmental Threats to the Computer Facility 
We will begin our discussion of physical security for computer facilities by identifying the 
environmental threats to IT resources and the precautions that could be taken to counter the 
threat. 
Figure 4. Computer Facility Threats and Precautions 
THREAT AGENT THREAT PRECAUTIONS 
Fire Destruction of IT 
resources/assets 
• Smoke detectors 
• Fire extinguishers 
• Sprinkler systems 
• Special gas (Halon) 
Smoke Media and component 
damage 
Smoke detectors 
Water Flooding via rain, 
broken pipes, ice, 
sprinkler systems 
• Water sensors in ceiling 
• Water sensors above and below raised floors 
Electricity Surges and outages • Line filters on computer's power supply 
• Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) on 
devices 
• Special circuits with isolated ground on 
each system 
• Anti-static carpets 
Lightning Destruction of IT 
resources/assets 
• Turn off and unplug devices 
• Grounded storage area for backup media 
HVAC (heating, 
ventilation, air 
conditioning) 
High/low temperatures, 
high/low humidity, or 
excessive dust 
• Temperature sensors/gauges 
• Humidity sensors/gauges 
• Filters 
• Heating and air conditioning 
Earthquake/ 
Vibration 
Equipment/media 
damage 
•' Set up computer room on lower floors of a 
building 
•' Keep equipment away from windows 
• Protect equipment from falling objects 
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Note that off-site storage of backup media is essential in each of these cases. The choice of 
a backup site is crucial, as are the procedural controls that are in place and enforced at the site. 
Many organizations choose a site that is too close to their local operation and whatever disaster 
impacts one site, generally impacts the other. System backup and local and off-site storage policy 
should address access control issues. The following questions are questions that would most 
likely be asked in a risk assessment to determine vulnerabilities in system backup procedures and 
off-site storage. 
• Are backups done regularly ? 
• Are they done correctly ? 
• Are they usable? When was the last time they were tested? 
• How are the backups protected on site? Are they susceptible to theft? Who could steal 
them? 
• Other than needing a tape and not being able to find it, is there a systematic way to notice if 
a backup tape is missing or stolen? 
• How difficult is it to locate a specific backup tape that is stored locally? When was the last 
time someone tried? 
• How are the backups stored off site? 
• Who can send or recall tapes from off site? What happens if this person is unavailable? 
• What ensures that tapes sent off site cannot be accessed by anyone except authorized people 
in your organization? 
• How long does it take to recover a tape from off site storage? Has this been tested in all 
seasons and in inclement weather? Are there procedures for emergency recovery 24 hours a 
day? Who must authorize emergency recovery? 
• If there were a major disaster, are the key backups necessary to restore service on site, in 
off-site storage, or somewhere else? 
• What hardware, software, or knowledge, if any, other than physical possession of the tape, 
is needed to restore files from the tape? Who controls the hardware, software, or knowl­
edge? Is there potential for this person to abuse this control? What happens if this person is 
unavailable? 
Securing the Computer Facility—Transitionine to MIS/IT 
With computers on every desktop, the challenge today is not only to lock the office, but to 
adquately protect wiring closets, "server farms," and corporate mainframes as well. Computer 
resources are distributed throughout a building in addition to being clustered within a computer 
room. The first line of physical defense is to take appropriate steps to secure the multitude of 
areas where the IT components reside. 
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If funding is limited, the existing access control system should be extended to protect the 
MIS/IT facilities. The same access cards should allow authorized employees and contractors to 
transition from employee space to MIS/IT space (refer to Figures 1 & 3). The access control 
system should log all accesses to include date/time, specific door, employee or card ID. The 
Security Office will ensure that access cards are properly protected and that cards are collected 
and disabled when employees terminate their relationship with the organization. Access to the 
facilities must be stringently controlled and monitored. The number of people who may grant 
access to these restricted areas must be kept to a minimum and there should be special approval 
required prior to granting an employee or contractor access to the MIS/IT facility. 
If funding is not an issue, a separate identification and authentication system should be 
used to protect the MIS/IT resources. Most identification and authentication requirements are 
implemented via a challenge-response system. "Who are you?" is the identification challenge and 
"Prove it!" is the authentication challenge. Employees must respond appropriately to both chal­
lenges to gain access. There are different methods for authentication. They are discussed below. 
By having a separate MIS/IT access control system, corporations have an additional safeguard 
that if the "corporate access" system is compromised, the MIS/IT access control system will 
continue to function. Cameras may be used for redundancy and for an electronic record of actual 
"faces" that enter and exit the restricted area. 
Authentication 
Authentication is critical to authorizing entry into "restricted areas." There are three prin­
ciples of authentication shown in Figure 5. Each of tliese methods will enhance security and make 
it more difficult to circumvent security measures. 
Figure 5. Authentication Principles 
Principles of 
Authentication 
" Method of 
" ~ Authentication " Example 
Something 
you know 
Passwords Password or 
Personal Identification Number 
(PIN) 
Something 
you have 
Tokean/SmartCards SecurlD Token RSA 
Smartcard 
Something 
you are 
Biometrics Fingerpring, voice print, retinal scan 
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These methods may be used separately or combined. Many organizations use hardware 
tokens or SmartCards with passwords or PINs. Because there are two factors involved, it is 
harder to compromise. Not only would a perpetrator have to know the password, but he/she 
would also need to have the physical token as well. 
Access Control Loss 
Physical access control logs are just as important as the logical access control logs that are 
kept and maintained for our networks and applications. With this in mind, it is critical that we 
take the same precautions and measures to safeguard these electronic records. Wadlow (p. 117) 
provides a number of questions that should be posed to the personnel that maintain the physical 
access control systems for an organization. 
• How are the access control system logs collected? 
• How are they backed up? 
• Do they log failed attempts? 
• Who can change access control policy for an employee or contractor? 
• What approval is required? 
• Can the access control system distinguish between the valid badge holder and someone 
holding a proper badge? 
• Is there a way to cross check access to restricted areas, perhaps via videotape? 
Additional Considerations 
Remember to protect the unprotected—walls should extend above dropped ceilings and 
below raised floors to prevent an intruder from bypassing door sensors. If it is important, take 
appropriate steps to ensure that air ducts are small enough to prevent a person from using them to 
gain unauthorized physical access to your IT resources. Avoid glass walls and protect cabling 
from unauthorized taps or sniffers by running it through protective conduit if possible. Use sur­
veillance devices where appropriate. Be prepared for denial of service. Be sure the security de­
sign addresses the following questions. 
• What access will there be to MIS/IT facilities if the badge access control system is out of 
commission? 
• What access will there be to those areas during a power failure? 
• What access to those areas must be provided for fire safety? What would jeopardize your 
security during a safety drill or emergency? 
• Are there mechanical keys to the secure doors? Who has them? How is their use logged? 
• Are keys stored inside and externally to the MIS/IT facility to prevent someone from lock­
ing themselves out? 
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It is usually feasible and sensible to deal with tlnese issues by equipping doors with a fire 
safety bar. It allows the door to be opened without power, but sets off a very loud, battery-
j owered alarm if the door is opened. 
SUMMARY 
Physical access control, identification and authentication, and transition protocols between 
! ecure and non-secure areas are critical to physical se;curity. Procedures and training cannot be 
I iverlooked in making employees know what is and is not allowed. Cameras are good for both 
' irevention and detection capabilities. Redundancy is key to validating information and ensuring 
hat resources are still protected even if one system ftdls or is compromised. Emergency proce­
dures should be tested before there is an emergency and under a variety of circumstances. 
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